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Designing Competition Law Institutions: Values,
Structure, and Mandate
Michael J. Trebilcock*
EdwardM. Iacobucci**
I. INTRODUCTION

Discussions of competition policy reform, both domestically and
internationally, have typically focused on issues of substance, for
example, appropriate rules for merger review, abuse of dominance, and
horizontal arrangements amongst competitors. However, substantive
policies must be mediated through the institutions that investigate,
enforce, and adjudicate competition law issues and the decision-making
processes that these institutions employ. As the legal realists long ago
taught us, institutional and procedural differences are likely to generate
widely different substantive outcomes, even with a similar legislative
mandate. 1 Over the past decade, the number of competition agencies
around the world has proliferated dramatically, now numbering in
excess of one hundred, rendering these differences of increasing
salience in a global economy.
In a recent paper prepared for the International Competition Network
(ICN), Kovacic and Eversley note:
Discussions about the implementation of competition policy tend to
focus more heavily upon the question of what competition authorities
should do than on the question of how they should do it .... Both
older and newer competition systems have come to realize that a body
of competition laws is only as good as the institutions entrusted with
their implementation. The establishment of new competition systems
and the refinement of older regimes have created a remarkable
prerequisites for the effective
opportunity to consider the institutional
2
implementation of competition laws.
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1. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporatingthe Administrative Process, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 162-66 (1998) (arguing that regulatory outcomes are a function of
administrative process rules).
2. WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & DECOURCEY EVERSLEY, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, AN

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 41

In another recent survey of agency effectiveness for the ICN, the
authors state:
Since its creation, the International Competition Network has
developed extensive analyses of competition policy practices around
the world and also has provided member jurisdictions with useful
recommendations and guidance on important competition issues ....
[R]elatively little emphasis has been placed on the institutions and
operational considerations through which competition law and policy
are implemented. While institutional and operational questions are
identified as important in ICN work products, there has not yet been a
systematic examination of how agencies
actually address institutional
3
and operational needs and constraints.
Most of the focus in these two studies is directed to the internal
institutional machinery of a specialized competition agency. The
studies emphasize the importance of periodic evaluation (internal or
external or a combination of both) of the agency's legislative powers
and activities; its internal organization and management; strategic
planning and priority setting, including the relative emphasis on
advocacy, education, and law enforcement; research capabilities;
transparency mechanisms; investments in information technology;
organizational structure; recruitment and retention of skilled
professionals (including the role of senior economists); budget
determination and allocation; and the effectiveness of past agency
decisions. 4 While observations on these issues by the authors of these
two reports are eminently sensible and are equally applicable to many
other government agencies, it is curious that the choice of basic
competition-agency models attracts two short, equivocal paragraphs in
only one of these studies. Kovacic and Eversley acknowledge that
"interviews with competition authorities concerning their experiences
with these various models indicate that this is a promising area for

ASSESSMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY: METHODS USED IN COMPETITION AGENCIES AND
WHAT WORKED FOR THEM 1 (2007) [hereinafter ICN, ASSESSMENT], available at

http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc368.pdf.

3. INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, COMPETITION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION WORKING
GROUP,
REPORT
ON
AGENCY
EFFECTIVENESS
3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc367.pdf.
4. See also WILLIAM E. KoVACIC, OFFICE OF THE FTC CHAIRMAN, THE

FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR SECOND CENTURY-THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF BETTER

PRACTICES, at ii-xv (2009), available at http:lwww.ftc.govlftclworkshopslftclOO/docsl
ftclOOrpt.pdf (presenting results of an FTC self-assessment and identifying institutional features
for positive substantive outcomes); Timothy J. Muris, Principlesfor a Successful Competition
Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 165-82 (2005) (providing a framework for defining success in
government agencies and offering guiding principles for an effective competition agency).
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additional research." 5
questions.

II.

This Article is devoted to these structural

KEY INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN QUESTIONS

Drawing on a previous paper, 6 we argue that any competition-policy
institutional regime must address five fundamental questions. First,
who investigates and initiates proceedings (including the relative roles
Second, to the extent that
of public and private enforcement)?
investigation and other enforcement activities are undertaken by the
government, which branch of the government is responsible? For
example, the questions of who hires competition policy bureaucrats, to
whom are they accountable, and whether the competition-enforcement
body is part of a line ministry or is an independent agency with its own
budget and personnel policies must be addressed. Third, what body
adjudicates contested competition proceedings? Does a branch of the
enforcement agency adjudicate, or is there a completely independent
body? What process does the adjudicative body follow? Fourth, to
what extent is there judicial review of competition decisions? Finally,
what role, if any, is there for political review by elected officials of
competition agency decisions?
The normative criteria or values for evaluating competition law
institutions are likely to be inherently uncontroversial. However, each
value implies an obverse value and indeed interactions with other
values, thus rendering the weighting of, or trade-offs among, values a
quintessential polycentric and highly contestable exercise. The key
dyadic values are listed below.
A. Independence-Accountability
On the one hand, competition law institutions obviously should be
free of day-to-day political interference on grounds extrinsic to their
mandate. On the other hand, at least in a representative democracy, it is
difficult to defend institutional independence without some form of
accountability, e.g., with respect to appointments, budgetary allocations,
financial expenditures, periodic mandate, and performance review.
B. Expertise-Detachment
Competition law matters typically require high levels of expertise in
5. See ICN, ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 12.
6. Michael Trebilcock & Edward lacobucci, Designing Competition Law Institutions, 25
WORLD COMPETITION 361, 372-80 (2002) (providing five questions for regimes to answer when
developing balanced competition policy).
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their resolution-expertise with respect to particular industries,
expertise in marshalling and interpreting empirical data, and expertise in
industrial organization theory. However, too close an involvement in
the industry in question or excessively doctrinaire commitments to
particular theoretical paradigms may compromise detachment in
evaluating or adjudicating novel arrangements or evolving economic or
theoretical environments.
C. Transparency-Confidentiality
In order to enhance the performance and public credibility of
competition laws' administration, high levels of transparency in
performing investigative, enforcement, and adjudicative functions are
desirable. Conversely, much of the information that a competition law
agency is required to evaluate from the immediate parties involved and
from competitors, suppliers, and customers is commercially highly
sensitive; and public disclosure may be seriously damaging to legitimate
business interests.
D. Administrative Efficiency-Due Process
Competing concerns also exist between administrative efficiency and
due process protections. Many matters with which a competition law
agency may be seized are time-sensitive (e.g., merger review).
However, timeliness in disposition is in tension with the value of due
process in providing all affected or interested parties a right to be heard,
to adduce evidence, and to contest the position of parties adverse in
interest.
E. Predictability-Flexibility
In a legal system based on the rule of law, significant value is placed
on the predictability and consistency with which laws are applied. In
such a legal system, affected parties can order their affairs with a fairly
high level of confidence in the nature of the rules that govern those
affairs. But the value of predictability is in tension with the obverse
value of flexibility where the evolution of economic theory and the
idiosyncrasies of particular industries, transactions, or practices may
require reevaluation and refinement of preexisting rules, policy
positions, or adjudicative decisions. 7 This leaves large domains of

7. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standardsin Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 49 (2007) (arguing that courts should avoid a generalized preference for standards and
instead consider a multitude of factors in choosing the ex ante precision of liability determinants
in antitrust lawsuits); David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not)
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uncertainty in the application of competition laws. In fact, this tension
is reflected in long-standing debates in the antitrust literature on the
8
relative roles of rules versus standards in this field.
Obviously, in balancing these various (ten) values, a complex,
subjective, and inevitably highly contentious optimizing calculus is
involved. Moreover, the complexity of this calculus is, in fact, greater
than the primary dyadic value tensions identified above in that many of
the values interact with one another in polycentric, mutually reinforcing,
or antithetical ways. For example, accountability may be antithetical to
administrative efficiency by proliferating appeal or review processes,
while expertise may enhance administrative efficiency. Confidentiality
and flexibility may be antithetical to due process, but due process, such
as that offered by non-specialized courts, may, in turn, be in tension
with expertise.
III. BASIC STRUCTURAL MODELS

In our earlier paper, we identified three basic models that seemed to
map reasonably well on to comparative experience. 9 However, there is
a wide range of variations or combinations of these prior models that
are either observable or imaginable. Under the bifurcated judicial
model, specialized investigative and enforcement agencies must bring
formal complaints before and seek remedial relief from the courts,
subject to normal rights of appeal to appellate courts. Under the
bifurcated agency model, specialized investigative and enforcement
agencies must bring formal complaints before separate, specialized
adjudicative agencies. Under the integrated agency model, a single
specialized agency undertakes investigative, enforcement, and
adjudicative functions. With respect to the latter two models, an
additional question arises as to what role, if any, there is for judicial
appeals or judicial review of adjudicative decisions by specialized
agencies.
A. Bifurcated JudicialModel
The bifurcated judicial model existed in Canada until a major round

Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 161 (2009) (suggesting that a singular

approach to antitrust regulation is undesirable when considering theories of optimal design in
antitrust rules); Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of

Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (2005) (proposing a general approach for antitrust regulators to
make optimal decisions given the inherent uncertainty of antitrust outcomes).
8. See supra note 7.

9. See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 6, at 368-83.
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of competition law reform in 1976 and continues to exist with the
criminal prohibitions in the Competition Act. It also prevails in the
United States with respect to the mandate of the U.S. Department of
Justice, which performs investigative and enforcement functions but
must initiate formal enforcement proceedings before federal courts to
obtain either criminal sanctions or civil relief. The Canadian experience
with this model has not been especially positive, particularly with the
merger and monopolization provisions in the statute. The combination
of a nebulous public interest standard of liability, the exacting criminal
law burden of proof on the Crown, and all-purpose criminal courts
meant that very few prosecutions were brought and almost all failed, so
that by the 1970s these provisions were largely a dead letter and
provided much of the impetus for the subsequent reform movement that
began in the 1970s.
The U.S. experience with the bifurcated judicial model has been
somewhat different. First, the Department of Justice, in initiating
formal enforcement proceedings, may elect whether to proceed by way
of criminal indictment or an application for civil relief. Second, formal
enforcement proceedings, whether criminal or civil, are brought before
federal courts, entailing the development of some degree of judicial
familiarity with antitrust issues over time. Third, private actions before
general civil courts, often involving jury trials, for antitrust violations
are an extremely important feature of U.S. antitrust laws, and account
for more than ninety percent of all enforcement actions; these private
actions are further encouraged by a combination of treble damages,
contingency fees, one-way cost rules, and liberal class-action
procedures, which are much less prominent features of most other
countries' competition law regimes (including Canada's). With two
major federal antitrust agencies, state antitrust regimes, and a broad
scope for private actions, the U.S. antitrust regime is far more
decentralized than any other in the world, and it is unlikely that other
10
countries should seek to emulate it.
With respect to accountability, the bifurcated judicial model entails
significant accountability through the process of judicial appeal. The
model scores poorly with expertise in the performance of the
adjudicative function, but conversely, does reasonably well with respect
to detachment. Again, the bifurcated judicial model scores well with

10. See generally William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Law Reform in Transition
Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 361 (2000) (evaluating American
antitrust institutions' adherence to the advice regularly given by Western observers to transition
economies).

20101

Designing Competition Law Institutions

respect to transparency and probably strikes a reasonable balance with
The model does not score well with
respect to confidentiality.
timeliness and process costs (administrative efficiency), although it does
provide a high level of protection of due process values for the cases
that are heard. However, to the extent that there are substitution effects
away from costly formal adjudication to informal resolution of
complaints within the investigative and enforcement agency, the model
may not, in fact, vindicate due process values.
B. Bifurcated Agency Model
The bifurcated agency model is the model that now exists in Canada
with respect to non-criminal, reviewable practices (e.g., abuse of
dominance, mergers, and restrictive practices). The Commissioner of
Competition (the Competition Bureau) performs investigative and
enforcement functions, and the Competition Tribunal, comprised of a
mix of federal court trial division judges and lay experts, performs the
adjudicative functions (subject to a right of appeal to the Federal Court
of Appeal).
A similar model exists in South Africa, where investigative and
enforcement functions are vested in the Competition Commission and
most adjudicative functions are vested in the Competition Tribunal with
rights of appeal to the Competition Appeal Court (a specialized division
of the High Court). A somewhat similar model has existed in the
United Kingdom for most of the post-war period, with the Director of
the Office of Fair Trading undertaking investigative and enforcement
functions, with adjudicative functions vested in either the Restrictive
Practices Court (a mix of judges and lay experts) or the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission (subject to the ultimate political decision-making
authority of the Secretary of State). Israel has also adopted a bifurcated
agency model where the Israeli Antitrust Agency investigates potential
anticompetitive conduct and makes declarations subject to appeal in
non-criminal cases to a specialized Competition Tribunal, comprised of
a judge and an expert lay member.
On its face, this model seems designed to achieve a reasonable
balance amongst the various values identified earlier in this Article.
The model ensures a high level of independence in the performance of
the adjudicative function, while ensuring some degree of accountability
in the performance of this function through the judicial appeal process.
It also appears designed to balance expertise and detachment in the
The Tribunal's proceedings are
composition of the Tribunal.
transparent, although some reasonable degree of confidentiality of
proprietary business information is ensured through in camera
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introduction of such evidence. The model may also be designed to
provide a reasonable balance between administrative efficiency and due
process values in that the Canadian Competition Tribunal's constituting
act provides that "[a]ll proceedings before the Tribunal shall be dealt
with as informally and expeditiously as the circumstances and
considerations of fairness permit," l l while the presence of judicial
members on the Tribunal is likely to ensure appropriate attention to due
process considerations. One might also expect such a Tribunal-with
mixed judicial and non-judicial membership-to strike a reasonable
balance between predictability and flexibility.
In fact, the experience of the Competition Tribunal since its creation
in 1986 has, in many respects, proven otherwise. Over the intervening
twenty-three years, the Tribunal has heard and decided a case on the
merits in only four contested merger cases and five contested abuse of
dominance/exclusive dealing/tying cases despite the fact that, in many
of the intervening years, the Bureau has examined several hundred
mergers per year. 12 Over ninety-nine percent of all mergers notified to
the Bureau are resolved within the Bureau through approval,
modification, undertakings, or abandonment. 13 It is clear from these
data that the Competition Tribunal has become a minor institutional
player in the competition policy process relative to the Competition
Bureau; this is contrary to the expectations of many participants in the
reform process, where it was widely assumed that the Tribunal would
become the central locus of authoritative expertise in the interpretation
or application of the reviewable practices provisions of the Competition
Act, at least in more difficult cases.
A large part of the explanation for this, as we argue in our earlier
paper, is that the resulting costs, delays, and uncertainty involved in
Tribunal proceedings have induced firms and the Commissioner to
substitute the locus of decision-making, even in difficult cases, away
from the Tribunal and towards the Bureau where process values, such as
transparency, accountability, and reasoned public decision-making, are
much diminished. This substitution effect has turned the Bureau into a
de facto integrated competition agency, performing investigative,
enforcement, and adjudicative functions. Moreover, the prominent role
played by the federal court trial division judges on the Tribunal (with
exclusive jurisdiction over questions of law) has encouraged federal
appellate judges to regard the Tribunal as little more than a regular court
11.
12.
13.

Competition Tribunal Act, R.S.C., ch. 19, § 9(2) (1985) (Can.).
Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 6, at 378.
Id.
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of first instance. The appellate judges feel relatively unconstrained
(non-deferential) in overruling its decisions and substituting their own
(non-expert) judgments on the merits.
The contested merger cases are instructive in revealing the
judicialization of the Competition Tribunal's proceedings. These cases
typically involve many days of hearings, voluminous documentary
evidence, many industry and expert witnesses, and a highly adversarial
process. The average time frame from the notice of application to the
Tribunal by the Commissioner to the Tribunal's decision (including that
on remedies) is almost twenty months in fully-contested merger cases
months from initial notification of the merger to
and about twenty-seven
14
the Bureau.
C. IntegratedAgency Model
With respect to the integrated agency model, a specialized
competition agency undertakes investigative, enforcement, and
adjudicative functions. Probably the best-known examples of such an
agency are the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
Competition Directorate of the European Commission (CDEC). Under
the FTC model, many cases are taken to an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) within the FTC from whom appeals lie to five commissioners
sitting as a panel; however, the FTC will take some matters, such as
applications for injunctive relief, to the general courts. In Europe, the
CDEC investigates and initially adjudicates competition questions
subject to approval of the Commission. EU Commissioners, however,
have little day-to-day involvement with these questions. Parties have a
right of appeal to the Court of First Instance and then to the European
Court of Justice. Beyond the competition law context, such integrated
agencies are common in a variety of other fields, including securities
commissions in both Canada and the United States.
With respect to the advantages of this model, it may yield higher
levels of expertise in that agency staff and commissioners are involved
in all aspects of the administration of competition laws on a day-to-day
basis. Due to this involvement, the model is likely to yield higher levels
of expertise than the bifurcated agency model, where the formal
adjudicative agency addresses episodically only a small fraction of all
competition law matters which result in formal proceedings.' 5 This
expertise not only assists in adjudication but also in policy-making,
perhaps through the promulgation of guidelines. In addition, because
14. Id. at 375.
15. Id.
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most integrated agencies are headed by multi-member commissions,
this arguably yields both higher levels of accountability and more
consistency and continuity of decision-making. Integrated agencies, in
part because of higher levels of expertise, may also have advantages in
terms of administrative efficiency (at least as reflected in the relatively
expeditious decision-making process in merger review before the
CDEC-typically five months from notification to decision).
With respect to the disadvantages of the integrated agency model, the
principal disadvantage is the reality-or at least perception-of bias by
decision-makers within such an agency in undertaking its formal
adjudicative functions. This is in large part because of the actual
potential of involvement in prior investigative and enforcement
decisions. This has been a concern with respect to the FTC, where
Commissioners must vote on the initiation of formal enforcement
proceedings and then subsequently adjudicate with respect to the same
proceedings (although ALJs are perceived to be more independent of
complaint counsel than the hearing examiners whom they replaced).
This has also been a widespread criticism of the CDEC model, although
the recent separation of the roles of case-handler and hearing examiner
and a more proactive role by the Court of First Instance in judicial
appeals in recent cases may have mitigated this concern.
The Jamaican Court of Appeal has recently held that the Jamaican
integrated agency model violates principles of natural justice. 16 In order
to allay this concern, if only partially, the Ontario Securities
Commission ensures that Commissioners involved in authorizing initial
proceedings are not involved in their adjudication. Another potential
disadvantage of the integrated model is that administrative efficiency
may come at some cost in terms of due process values, at least in the
relatively informal administrative or inquisitorial model of decisionmaking employed by the CDEC. 17 To the extent that these concerns are
addressed within a single agency by moving to a more adversarial
model, as the FTC has done, the advantages of administrative efficiency
of the integrated model relative to the bifurcated agency model are
sharply diminished.

16.

INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK,

COMPETITION POLICY IMPLEMENTATION WORKING

GROUP, LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF YOUNG COMPETITION AGENCIES I I

[hereinafter ICN, LESSONS], presented at the Fifth Annual Conference, Cape Town, S. Afr. (May
3-5, 2006).
17. David Gerber, Two Models of Competition Iaw, in COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW:
APPROACHING AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF ANTITRUST LAW 113-15 (Hanns Ullrich ed.,
1998).
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IV. THE SCOPE OF A COMPETITION AGENCY'S MANDATE

A number of important and difficult institutional design issues arise
in defining a competition agency's mandate. First, it could be vested:
with functions beyond the area of competition policy, such as consumer
protection (e.g., the Canadian Competition Bureau and the U.S. FTC);
with price regulation functions with respect to some industries (e.g., the
Australian
Competition
and
Consumer
Commission);
with
administration of intellectual property laws; with review of and
enforcement of restrictions on foreign investment in some sectors; with
protection or promotion of local employment or indigenous small and
medium-sized businesses (e.g., the Black Economic Empowerment
provisions in South African competition law); or with a more
amorphous public interest mandate that ranges well beyond consumer
welfare and efficiency considerations. Many of these functions are
likely to be antithetical to promoting competitive markets. They are
also likely to carry serious risks of deflecting the agency from an
unambiguous commitment to this policy goal and to complicate and
potentially compromise accountability for its performance against a
clear set of policy goals.
Second, if these risks of mandate diffusion or ambiguity are sought to
be mitigated by vesting these various functions in other agencies, a new
set of problems arises in managing institutional interdependencies and
cooperation effectively. This has proven to be a particularly acute
problem in Canada with respect to regulated industries, especially
federally regulated industries such as telecommunications, broadcasting,
banks, airlines, and railways, where sector-specific regulators have
extensive jurisdiction (often subject to Ministerial oversight or
override). 18 While the Competition Bureau's jurisdiction may be
concurrent in some respects (e.g., merger review), in other respects this
turns on the extent to which the specialized sector-specific regulator has
chosen to forbear from regulating activities in the sector in question on
the grounds that it considers competitive forces to be a sufficient
discipline. Especially in large national network infrastructure industries
where sector-specific regulation, including merger review, is often
subject to Ministerial or Cabinet appeal or override in many
jurisdictions (including Canada), there will also be issues of whether the
competition agency's decisions in these sectors should be subject to
similar political appeal or oversight.
18. See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 6, at 380 ("[W]here the Commissioner of
Competition is mandated to provide a competitive assessment of proposed mergers . . . the
Competition Tribunal has been excluded from any role in merger review ... ").
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V. SPECIAL CHALLENGES FACING NEW COMPETITION AGENCIES IN
TRANSITION OR DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

About sixty countries have competition agencies that are fifteen years
19
or younger in age-mainly in transition or developing economies.
The World Bank reports that a 2000 survey found that, on average,
competition authorities in industrial countries are forty percent more
effective than competition authorities in developing countries. 20 In
recent surveys or evaluations of the experience of such agencies by the
Competition Policy Implementation Working Group of the International
Competition Network 2' and the International Development Research
Centre (Ottawa), 2 a number of challenges were identified. These
challenges are addressed in turn below.
First, many countries have borrowed heavily from developed
countries in designing their respective laws, and the legislative
framework does not effectively address the realities of the jurisdiction
that these agencies are called upon to regulate. Some statutes fail to
address important anticompetitive forms of conduct because of carveouts or exceptions for industrial policy, political economy, or other
reasons. Others are expansive in their scope but fail to establish any set
of priorities for the agency consistent with its resources and capabilities.
Others do not provide for compulsory ex ante notification of mergers,
yet others set notification thresholds so low that agencies are
overwhelmed with merger notifications that they are not able effectively
to review. In other instances, agencies are not invested with adequate
investigative powers to unearth and eliminate anticompetitive conduct
or are unable to effectively enforce compulsory disclosure laws and lack
powers to grant immunities to facilitate cartel investigations. Finally, in
some countries, fines and other penalties are too low to induce effective
deterrence or cannot be effectively enforced.
Second, young agencies commonly report a lack of cooperation and
19. A recent survey and analysis of the competition laws of 102 countries finds mild
preliminary support for the claim that competition law has a positive, albeit quite limited, effect
on the intensity of competition within a nation. Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around
the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74

ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 275 (2007). Much of the impact appears to be due to the strength of
enforcement in particular areas rather than the scope of the substantive law, largely through
reducing collusive practices. Id The study finds that merger or abuse of dominance law does not
seem to enhance competition intensity. Id.
20.

WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS

FOR MARKETS 141 (2002).
21. ICN, LESSONS, supra note 16, at 8-38.
22. TAIMOON STEWART ET AL., INT'L DEV. RESEARCH CTR., COMPETITION LAW INACTION:
EXPERIENCES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 19-20,26-31 (2007).
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467

coordination of policy and effort with particular government ministries
and other regulatory bodies in their attempt to enforce and promote
competition policy. This is partly a result of the recent introduction of
competition laws without provisions that address prior conflicting
legislation or sectoral regulatory regimes. In some cases, these
problems have been mitigated by memoranda of understanding with
other agencies as to respective roles and responsibilities.
Third, many agencies in developing countries face major obstacles in
dealing with cross-border anticompetitive conduct, especially
international cartels, and often lack formal and informal cooperative
mechanisms with other countries' authorities with more effective
jurisdiction over potential wrongdoers.
Fourth, many agencies responding to the ICN survey indicated
challenges relating to the interface between the competition authority
and the judiciary. The agencies reported that cases have often taken
years to process, partly as a result of a lack of specialized competence of
public prosecutors, attorneys, and the local judiciary. An earlier ICN
survey2 3 of competition agencies in developing and transition
economies reported:
The all-but unanimous view expressed is that the judiciary is a major
stumbling block in the path of effective competition enforcement-the
judges do not understand competition law and are content to avoid the
necessity to learn through diverting competition issues into a maze of
esoteric administrative and procedural side-streets out of which the
substantive matters at issue rarely emerge.
Fifth, many new agencies suffer from extreme financial and human
resource constraints that pose major challenges in priority setting.
Additionally, such agencies are often plagued by political cronyism that
compromises the quality of key appointments. Developing specialized
human capital within agencies and complementary educational and
24
professional institutions is a pressing challenge.
Finally, the studies note the lack of a competition culture in many of
the jurisdictions in which these new agencies operate. This is reflected
in a lack of awareness by the business community, government
agencies, non-government agencies, the media, the judiciary, and the
general public of the rules of competition law and their overall
23. INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, CAPACITY BUILDING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE:
BUILDING CREDIBLE COMPETITION AUTHORITIES IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES
35 (2003) [hereinafter ICN, CAPACITY], available at www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
24. See Daniel Sokol, The Development of Human Capital in Latin American Competition
Policy, in COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 13 (Eleanor Fox & Daniel Sokol
eds., 2009).
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responsibility to ensure that such rules are observed in the interest of
competition and overall economic development. Many of these new
agencies are operating in economies in transition from command to
market economies, with major state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or only
recently privatized SOEs-often operating in highly concentrated
sectors. Furthermore, many developing countries struggle with long
histories of state-led development policies, including import substitution
policies that severely restrict import competition and foreign
investment, extensive SOEs and highly concentrated economic sectors
often subject to extensive price, entry, and exit regulation. This implies
that both within and outside government there are substantial vested
interests in policies that are antithetical to effective competition. 25 An
earlier ICN report concluded:
In the end, we have been persuaded that the over-arching challenge
confronting competition authorities in developing and transition
countries relates to their stature and standing within the ranks of key
stakeholders or interest groups, as well as the public at large. In other
words, all struggle to make themselves heard and it is this that
constitutes the gravest
challenge confronting competition authorities
26
in these countries.
Many of the challenges associated with a lack of a competition
culture have been insightfully analyzed by William Kovacic in several
2 Kovacic, based on extensive experience
papers 27 and by Michal Gal. 28

25. See Ignacio de Le6n, A Market Process Analysis of Latin American Competition Policy 5
(Apr. 22, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=258959 ("The pervasive involvement of
Latin governments in running economic affairs soon enticed them to erect all sorts of barriers to
competition and trade.").
26. ICN, CAPACITY, supra note 23, at 74.
27. See generally William E. Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneurand Law Reform
in Formerly Communist and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 437 (1996)
(discussing difficulties of public officials in implementing competition policy systems); William
E. Kovacic, Developing and Implementing Competitions and Consumer Protection Reforms in
Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 1197 (1995) (discussing the effect of antitrust and consumer protection systems
in promoting the development of free markets in transition economies); William E. Kovacic,
Getting Started. Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition Economies, 23
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 403 (1997) (analyzing strong political opposition, limited legal and economic
expertise, and resource austerity as barriers to effective competition programs); William E.
Kovacic, Institutional Foundationsfor Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The
Case of Competition Policy in Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265 (2001)
[hereinafter Kovacic, Institutional Foundations] (examining economic law reform in transition
economies in light of the development of competition systems).
28. Michal S. Gal, The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditionsfor Competition Law Enforcement
in Developing Countries, in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
COMPETITION, COMPETITIVENESS AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 20-38 (Phillip Brunsick et al. eds., 2004) (analyzing the effects of socio-economic
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in advising new competition agencies, focuses particularly on prioritysetting given three forms of scarcity-financial, human, and political
capital-and argues convincingly that in the initial stages of a new
agency's mandate, it should focus on education, publicity, and advocacy
programs, as well as building internal capacity and enhancing the
capacity of collateral institutions, such as university research programs,
professional associations, sectoral regulators, and the media in their
engagement with competition policy issues. In a second phase, Kovacic
recommends that a new agency focus on a short list of enforcement
priorities, such as the following: eliminating hardcore cartels;
monitoring barriers to new business entry; studying strategic
bottlenecks to competition in terms of access to key infrastructure;
preserving the benefits of recent privatization initiatives; eliminating
collusive schemes directed at public procurement; barring the
continuation of inter-firm relationships that may have flourished during
earlier periods of central planning; addressing complex and arbitrary
taxation systems, policing anti-competitive forms of price controls, and
restrictive labor laws.
One striking feature of Kovacic's list of enforcement priorities is that
many challenges facing new competition agencies in transition or
developing economies are the legacy of the role of the state in planned
economies. The World Bank also notes that in developing countries the
main institutional barriers to competition are government regulations on
entry and exit of firms. 29 As Gal points out, 30 this raises severe political
economy problems for new competition agencies with limited capacity
and a shallow and fragile political base with diffuse beneficiaries-in
contrast to the typically more concentrated beneficiaries of the status
quo-in confronting anti-competitive policies that find their ultimate
genesis in the state that created these agencies. Unlike competition
agencies in developed countries, new competition agencies in transition
and developing economies often find themselves in actual or potential
conflict with other agencies of government, and the vested private
sector interests that these agencies have created-in effect, government
at war with itself-whereas in developed economies competition
agencies are primarily concerned with purely private sector conduct.
Thus, as a recent review of competition law in developing countries by

ideology, institutional and organizational conditions, and political economy conditions on
competition law in developing countries).
29. WORLD BANK, supra note 20, at 135.
30. See Gal, supra note 28, at 30 ("[T]hose who make the choices underlying public policies
do not always have the motivations to adopt socially desirable policies.").
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31
the International Development Research Centre (Canada) points out,
new agencies face the daunting and politically-fraught challenge of
establishing both an intellectual and political constituency for their
activities in an often hostile or at least skeptical environment, facing
ever-present risks from vested interests of regulatory capture in the
framing of their legislation (carve-outs or exceptions for economically
and politically influential sectors) or in the efficacy of their enforcement
efforts.
Relating these challenges back to institutional structure, a 2003 ICN
report notes some tension in the structural implications of the advocacy
and enforcement roles of the agencies:
If enforcement is the most important goal that the authorities are
pursuing, then the institutional structure should favour predictability
and fairness of decision-making, or, as it is commonly referred to,
independence. On the other hand, if competition-oriented reforms are
the most important policy objectives, then the institutional structure
must allow for the greatest possible influence with
the policymakers,
32
thus providing expertise for the political debate.

As discussed in Part II, there will always be these kinds of tradeoffs
in choosing an institutional model. In the context of developing
countries, the weights assigned to competing considerations are likely
different from those in the developed antitrust world. In particular, in
our view, the dangers associated with a lack of expertise are acute for
new antitrust regimes. For this reason, we tend to favor the integrated
model, where investigators and adjudicators are drawn from the same
talent pool. We recognize the concerns about independence that follow
from this model, but view it as the preferable alternative. In the early
years of an antitrust regime, human capital in the sector will be thin.
Adopting an integrated model allows enforcers and adjudicators to
move more quickly up the learning curve than the other models, in
which adjudicators will have only sporadic contact with antitrust policy.
It is better to have potentially biased experts than to have independent,
but uninformed, adjudicators.
Experience in Canada is instructive.
When antitrust law was
modernized in 1986, a bifurcated agency model was adopted. As noted
above, practice appears to have reached an equilibrium in which the
adjudicators are relegated to a secondary role at best. This is selfreinforcing: if the adjudicative agency, the Competition Tribunal, does
not hear cases, and its members are otherwise not engaged with current

31.
32.

STEWART ET AL., supra note 22, at 33-34.
ICN, CAPACITY, supra note 23, at 30.
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antitrust policy, then there is no opportunity for it to develop expertise,
and the parties will seek to avoid hearings before it, all else equal. An
integrated agency, on the other hand, would facilitate the development

of human capital by adjudicators who also serve in enforcement roles.
The possible sacrifice of some independence associated with the

integrated model may be warranted in new antitrust regimes in order to
encourage the development of expertise.
VI. CONCLUSION

We are only beginning to come to terms with how key institutional
design issues-values, structure, and mandate-in the competition
policy area are likely to impact substantive policy outcomes. But it is
obviously the case that no single institutional model of a competition
agency will be optimal for all countries, developed and developing,
given particularities of history, initial conditions, institutional traditions,
Efforts at international
and political economy considerations. 3 3
harmonization or convergence of substantive competition law face a
host of obstacles, both practical and principled. 34 The importance of
locally optimal institutions reinforces the importance of locally optimal
substantive law, rendering an extensive international harmonization
project even more impractical and undesirable.

33. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting the need for institutional flexibility as
governments evolve). See also Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 27, at 405
(discussing obstacles to implementation of effective competition programs). See generally
Mariana Prado & Michael Trebilcock, Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of
Institutional Reform, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 341 (2009) (discussing path dependence theory in the
context of institutional reform).
34. For various perspectives on the international harmonization of competition laws, see
COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004). For arguments in support of a relatively
conservative approach to international harmonization initiatives, see Michael Trebilcock &
Edward lacobucci, National Treatment and Extraterritoriality:Defining the Domains of Trade
and Antitrust Policy, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT, supra, at 152 (arguing that the
extraterritorial application of domestic antitrust law can be desirable but requires certain
organizing principles). See generally Michael Trebilcock, Trade Liberalization, Regulatory
Diversity, and Political Sovereignty, in SUSTAINABILITY, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE (John Kirton & Peter Hajnal eds., 2006) (discussing factors traditionally thought to
be outside trade policy and their effect on non-tariff barriers to trade); Michael Trebilcock &
Robert Howse, A Cautious View of International Harmonization: Implications from Breton's
Theory of Competitive Governments, in COMPETITION AND STRUCTURE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS (Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon & Ronald Wintrobe
eds., 2000) (critiquing international harmonization for eliminating the benefits of competition
within and between governments).

